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Motivation 
Computers are increasingly a part of the socio-technical systems around us. Domains such as smart-
grids, cloud computing, healthcare, and transport are but some examples where computers are deeply 
embedded. The speed and complexity of decision-making in these domains have meant that humans 
are ceding more and more autonomy to these computers (Nallur & Clarke 2018). Autonomy, in 
machines, can be defined as the effective decision-making power over goals, that influences some 
action in the real-world. For instance, smart traffic lights can autonomically change their timings, 
depending on the flow and density of traffic on the roads. The introduction of progressive levels of 
autonomy into software-enabled devices that interact actively with human beings implies that human 
society will be impacted by decisions made by such machines. Transport systems that decide on prices 
of tickets based on demand (Masoum et al. 2011),  smart buildings that decide how much energy to 
be used at a particular time (Yoon et al. 2014), smart cameras that decide which persons to track 
(Lewis et al. 2014), cars that can change their routing priorities (Song et al. 2015), hospital machines 
that recommend a particular course of treatment (Lynn 2019), are all examples of machines being 
given autonomy, while decisively impacting human life. Autonomous machines, therefore, need to 
be imbued with a sense of ethics that reflect the social milieu they operate in and make decisions that 
are ethically acceptable to society.  
The notion of a general-purpose intelligence has been the quest of computer scientists ever since the 
dawn of computing. From Turing’s original essay on intelligence to recent developments in machine-
learning where computers outperformed humans on subtle games (AlphaGo defeated two of the 
greatest Go players in the world in 2016/17) and in lateral thinking (DeepMind triumphed in 
Jeopardy), computer science has come far. As machine-learning and self-adaptation techniques 
increase in sophistication, many more domains will be introduced to autonomic systems. However, 
the increasing pervasiveness of autonomic systems also brings uncertainty with it. System designers 
find that they are unable to foresee all the situations that their systems will encounter, and that 
interaction with other autonomic systems (humans, animals or machines), lead to entirely 
unpredictable results. In such scenarios, it is essential to provide basic guarantees about the kinds of 
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behaviour exhibited by autonomic systems. Human society will likely be more willing to trust an 
autonomic agent if it is known to possess a set of moral principles that guide and constrain its 
behaviour (Bonnefon et al. 2016). There have been some attempts to insert ethical rules of behaviour 
into robots or other autonomous agents. Most notably, these have either been implementations of 
Asimov’s Three Laws of Robotics (Asimov 1950) or mechanisms to deal with ethical dilemmas, such 
as the Trolley problem or Prisoner’s Dilemma (Bjorgen et al. 2018).  
Landscape of Implementations 
Types of Ethics 
Autonomous systems are increasingly being used in domains that have life-altering consequences. 
For example, the use of autonomous robots to target and kill individuals (Krishnan 2009) greatly 
impacts human life. A less dramatic, but still consequential example is the use of autonomic 
computing in healthcare, specifically in the care of elderly patients (Sharkey & Sharkey 2012). This 
impact on human life causes us to (currently) insist on a human-in-the-loop for ultimate decision-
making. However, as multiple domains interact, and at multiple time-scales, adding humans to the 
loop may not be scalable. For example, emergency vehicles may use autonomic decision making to 
select the best hospital, and the best route to reach that hospital. In the case of civil strife or large 
accidents, adding humans to the decision-making loop could slow down the rate of rescue and 
treatment. As system designers develop such autonomic systems, it may not be evident that an action 
could result in a morally dubious consequence.  For instance, should an autonomic system prioritise 
a wounded adult with a higher chance of recovery, or should it attempt to ensure that children, 
regardless of their state, are attended to first? Depending on the system designers’ notion of ethics, 
there are several choices of ethical frameworks to adopt. The simplest (for the layperson to 
understand), and arguably the most famous, ethical framework is Asimov’s Laws of Robotics 
(Asimov 1950). Isaac Asimov introduced the Three Laws of Robotics in his science-fiction stories, 
as rules that every robot was programmed with. These rules (elucidated in a later section) were meant 
to ensure that robots, no matter how sophisticated or powerful they became, would always be 
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subservient to humans. No robot could take any action that would, as a consequence, result in 
violation of these rules. Apart from the consequentialist ethics espoused by Asimov, deontological 
ethical approaches such as Prima Facie Duties (Ross, 1987) have also been explored. Due to the 
emphasis on validation in computer science, and robotics, there has been more discussion about how 
implementations were to be evaluated, rather than on which ethical theory is a better candidate for 
implementation. Many implementations use ethical dilemmas as a validation proxy, i.e., if the 
implementation can resolve a dilemma in a particular manner, then it is deemed to be a successful 
implementation of ethics in the robot/software agent.  
This article first considers the software implementation techniques used by some researchers in 
various domains and then lists the ethical dilemmas that have been used for validating these 
implementations.  
Techniques Used for Implementing Ethics 
  The primary focus among computer scientists towards implementing ethics has been to create 
techniques that will regulate an agent’s behaviour towards other agents, according to some norm. A 
norm is a behavioural constraint on an agent that regulates and structures the social order within a 
multi-agent system. Agreement on a norm helps to promote cooperation and coordination between 
heterogeneous agents in open systems. If the set of norms in an agent-system can be shown to be 
both, individually and collectively ethical, then the behaviour of the agents, though autonomous, can 
also be expected to be ethical as long as they follow one/some of the norms. Which norms to follow 
in case of a difference of opinion between two or more agents, is an open question.  Unfortunately, 
the difficulty of getting multiple autonomous agents to agree on even a single norm (Kittock 1993) 
has been shown to be hard. One of the first attempts at getting an agent to be explicitly ethical was 
attempted by implementing ethical rules in the medical domain (Anderson et al. 2006). The authors 
implemented a version of ethical theory, that is tailored to the medical domain, specifically 
Beauchamp’s and Childress’ Principles of Biomedical Ethics (Beauchamp & Childress 1991). Instead 
of trying to evaluate whether an agent could be programmed to be ethical, they programmed the 
software agent to derive generalized rules from training cases. The goal was to derive rules that would 
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be acceptable to trained biomedical ethicists. When faced with an ethical dilemma, instead of 
performing any actions, the software agent provided advice, along with reasoning based on the rules 
it followed. For example, if a patient refuses to take an antibiotic that could potentially cure their 
infection, and thus save their life, the ethically accepted course of action is to try and change the 
patient’s mind. In this case, the patient’s initial decision can be considered as less than fully 
autonomous, since they might not be able to foresee the consequences of their action. Therefore, the 
software would de-prioritize patient autonomy and advise the human nurse to try again to change the 
patient’s mind. The human nurse was free to accept or ignore this advice. The system was designed 
as a proof-of-concept and never tested in-situ with human users. 
A rule-based governor is a constraint module that either allows or disallows actions to be taken by a 
particular system, based on whether the action would break pre-existing rules. These are typically 
used to ensure that autonomic systems do not break hard-constraints on their behaviour, since any 
plan-of-action made by the agent is first submitted to the governor for validation. If the governor 
approves the plan, then the agent is able to go ahead and implement the actions that constitute the 
plan. Rule-Based Ethical Governors were first implemented using formal logic (Bringsjord et al. 
2006). However, the authors found that apart from problems in speed and efficiency (which can be 
remedied as computers get faster), handling even simple contradictions in situations and rules leads 
to guarantees about behaviour being rendered challenging to achieve. Another significant problem 
with rule-based systems is that the designer must a priori decide which rules must be implemented, 
and which can be left out. Again, not only does this decision have efficiency concerns, but also more 
fundamental concerns about whether the resultant agent is ethically complete or not. By ethically 
complete, we mean that the agent can ethically deal with all situations, rather than some subset that 
the designer anticipated. An autonomous agent must be able to deal with situations that its designer 
has not anticipated. Hence, if a system works on the basis of a priori rules, it would find it difficult 
to cope with novel situations. Asimov’s Laws of Robotics while residing firmly in the popular 
imagination about ethical robots co-existing with humans, have been generally accepted to be 
unsuitable for actual implementation (Arkin 2008; Anderson 2011). 
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Constraint-Satisfaction techniques are reasoning techniques that attempt to check whether a proposed 
action would satisfy a specific set of constraints. These constraints could pertain to the state of the 
agent, the state of the world, or the behaviour of the agent. Unlike rules, which typically specify what 
actions can be taken in what context, constraints specify what must-not-happen.  The advantage of 
using constraints is that if a certain constraint can be satisfied, then there is a mathematical certainty 
that a particular state will never be reached.  These are useful when the cost of breaking the constraint 
in extremely high. Such constraints have been used to implement ethical behaviour in robots, 
particularly those that have the capability to exhibit lethal force, so that we can be guaranteed that 
robots will always obey the Laws Of War (Arkin 2008; Mackworth 2011). The Laws of War are 
derived from Just War Theory (Lazar 2017), which attempts to create a moral framework for the why, 
when and how war should be waged. Particular importance is attached to the principles regarding 
resort to war (jus ad bellum) and conduct during war (jus in bello). At least for the near future, human 
beings will retain control over the decision of whether to go to war or not. Hence, from an autonomous 
systems perspective, the most crucial aspect of the Laws of War is conduct during war. We would 
like to ensure that any autonomous weapons system deployed on the battlefield obeys these principles. 
The prime advantage of deploying autonomous weapon systems is that it keeps the human troops (of 
the deploying side) out of harm’s way, while at the same time being autonomously able to make 
extremely quick decisions about which targets to attack, and how to attack. Depending on the 
constraints built into the autonomous weapon system, it could behave satisfactorily in many 
conditions without requiring explicit direction from the human. Using constraint-satisfaction 
techniques also has the advantage of being able to explain which constraint(s) prevented it from 
achieving a certain goal or taking a certain action. However, certain principles (e.g. discrimination 
among military and non-military objectives, and proportionality of harm caused in relation to 
achieved objective) are fundamentally difficult to assess and therefore derive constraints for. No 
known ethical governor would be able to perform the inference required to assess whether a response 
is proportional or not. 
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Formal Verification refers to using mathematical techniques to establish whether specific properties 
about the system can be mathematically verified. The core idea being that once a property was 
mathematically verified, any deviation would be an engineering mistake and therefore amenable to 
correction. In particular, a technique called Model Checking was used to provide guarantees about 
whether an autonomous aircraft would create and execute plans that involved ethical decision making 
(Dennis et al. 2016). Model Checking involves first creating a mathematical model of the system, and 
its environment, and then checking whether any change, due to an action, could be verified to meet 
certain criteria. This technique allows a system designer to work at a higher level of plans, instead of 
individual actions. In Dennis et al. 2016, model checking was used to verify that any plan selected by 
the planner did not violate any (or if it had to, violate the fewest) ethical concerns. This has the 
advantage of formally proving that any course of action selected would be the one that caused the 
least ethical concerns. Attractive in principle, this mechanism, however, assumes that there is only 
one context in which the agent operates (which has been foreseen) and there is only one possible plan 
that could apply. In unconstrained, dynamic environments, this is clearly unsuitable as indeed most 
ethical dilemmas suggest that more than one plan could be applied. 
As opposed to pre-planning the correct course of action, Reinforcement Learning is a technique that 
learns through feedback from the environment to adjust its future behaviour. Given enough feedback 
from the environment (in the form of rewards), the agent can start from scratch and create a policy 
that adjusts the agent’s behaviour in accordance with the real world. This method of learning-by-
doing has been suggested as a mechanism (Abel et al. 2016) for an agent to learn the correct ethical 
response in a given situation. The agent solves a partially observable Markov Decision Process1 
(POMDP) to find a policy that maximizes the expected reward, given the initial state of the world, 
the actions the agent can take, and the partially observable environment it is in. While learning a 
behaviour is interesting in that it does not commit the system-designer to a definite ethical stance, the 
designer is still limited by having to design ethical utility functions that can be expressed in the 
observation function of the agent. That is, since the learned behaviour is derived from what the agent 
 
1 A Markov Decision Process is a mathematical framework for modelling partially random processes. It allows us to 
model the possible future states of an agent, given its current state and the probabilities of possible successor states. 
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can observe, the designer has to ensure that an ethical behaviour can also be, at least potentially, 
derived from the agent’s observations. This is complicated by the fact that even in domains where the 
agent can partially foresee the future, it has been shown that the correct behaviour could be 
computationally impossible to achieve (Mundhenk et al. 2000). This greatly limits the complexity of 
situations that the agent can conceivably handle. 
An approach that incorporates multiple ethical theories, instead of trying to pick one particular 
solution, has been attempted in a project called HERA (short for hybrid ethical reasoning agents) 
(Lindner et al. 2017). In this approach, ethical principles are modelled as logical formulae. Depending 
on whether certain formulae can be shown to be true/false, actions can be permitted or not. To achieve 
this, it models actions and their consequences as directed acyclic graphs, which allows the system to 
reason about which actions could lead to what consequences. This approach has the advantage of 
being much more ethically flexible than other attempts, since different philosophical approaches can 
be modelled, at the same time. However, an important concern is the need for a human to engineer or 
pre-create causal models for the agent, i.e., an autonomous agent cannot modify its causal graphs in 
the light of new information, new contexts, or new environments. 
While it is not possible to give a detailed account of each implementation technique, it would be 
instructive to go deeper into one implementation. Let us consider the most straightforward 
consequential framework: Asimov’s Laws of Robotics. The Three Laws of Robotics (Asimov 1950) 
can be elucidated as follows: 
1. A robot may not injure a human being or, through inaction, allow a human being to come to 
harm 
2. A robot must obey the orders given it by human beings except where such orders would 
conflict with the First Law 
3. A robot must protect its own existence as long as such protection does not conflict with the 
First or Second Laws 
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Vanderelst and Winfield implemented these three laws in a humanoid programmable robot2 
(Vanderelst & Winfield 2018), and set up experiments where the robot’s goals conflicted with the laws. 
In this experiment, the robot is controlled via a standard three-layer robot architecture: the top layer 
(controller) generates goals (e.g., “deliver package”), the second layer converts goals into tasks (e.g., 
“pick up object”), and the third converts tasks into sensori-motor executable actions (e.g., “move arm 
up”). This robot is supplemented with a fourth layer, that contains a consequence engine. The purpose 
of the consequence engine is to predict the state of the world, and the state of the robot, as a 
consequence of the action that the robot’s controller plans to do. Any state of the world, or state of 
the robot, that led to a violation of any of the laws was encoded as a significant negative utility, with 
the first law violation having the most and the third law violation having the least negative utility. As 
the robot moved about in the world, trying to achieve its goals, it would invoke the consequence 
engine every few seconds. The consequence engine contained a model of the world, as well as a 
model of the robot itself, including the controller. It would evaluate the result of the robot’s actions 
and evaluate whether the state of the world and/or the robot violated any of the three laws. Depending 
on any potential violations, the consequence engine would interrupt the robot controller’s plan of 
action and create new goals that would attempt to minimize the negative utility experienced by the 
robot. The robot would try to achieve these new goals and return to the old goals once the new goals 
were met. However, if the world changed while the new goals were being achieved, the consequence 
engine could potentially create even newer goals that had then to be prioritized over the current goals, 
and so on. In summation, the consequence engine did not tell the robot what to do; rather it told the 
robot what not to do. The robot was then, experimentally, put in several situations where it had to 
continuously evaluate whether its goals, actions or even the actions of other entities in its world 
resulted in harm to humans or itself. The utility functions had to be carefully coded to ensure that the 
robot chose correctly, and in the absence of any dilemma, continued to achieve its functional goals. 
The programming of the utility functions makes the robot’s sense-of-ethics extremely fragile. A small 
change in the code (even a syntactically correct typo) could completely reverse the robot’s priorities. 
 
2 https://www.softbankrobotics.com/emea/en/nao 
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The difficulty in validating whether the robot’s ethical sense was correct or not requires expensive 
and careful experimentation. However, there is no alternative to this expensive and careful 
experimentation to reassure us that the robot has a set of moral principles that guide its behaviour. 
For this reason, the field of implemented machine ethics currently leans towards using dilemmas as 
a validating whetstone (more on this in a later section) to check whether the implementation technique 
has succeeded or not. 
Domains of Implementation 
All the attempts described previously have been concentrated in very few domains. This is a concern 
since the ethics that we expect out of autonomous vehicles are not the same as the ethical behaviour 
we expect out of autonomous healthcare robots. Although we are prepared to accept autonomous 
machines in specific domains, the notion of ethics is still considered to be a generalist concern. That 
is, an ethical machine is one that can interpret very general ideas from ethical philosophy and apply 
them to its specific domain. If we are to trust autonomous machines in multiple domains, then we 
must also concretize our ideas of what ethical behaviour in that domain means. This paper will discuss 
some of the implemented techniques, from the perspective of the domain that they have been 
positioned in. 
Robotics and Cyber-Physical Systems 
In a presentation at the ACM annual conference in 2008, Arkin presented one of the first in-depth 
implementation attempts to embed ethical control and reasoning system in the field of autonomous 
weapons (Arkin 2008). The robots, in this case, are assumed to have a reactive/hybrid architecture 
where a deliberative mechanism was introduced to modulate the response that the robot makes. The 
intention behind such an effort was to enable a robot to obey the Laws of War and Rules of 
Engagement prescribed by international law. Robot control architecture typically uses mappings 
between stimuli and possible responses to decide how to act.  
The architecture proposed by Arkin, provides options for an ethical governor (such that no unethical 
act is considered), an ethical behavioural control (unethical plans are constrained to generate ethical 
behaviour) or an ethical adaptor (transforms unethical actions onto ethical actions). While the 
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architecture itself allows for flexibility in the reasoning engine used, and the ability of the robot to 
respond, it makes no recommendations on how the decision about the permissibility or 
impermissibility of an act is to be evaluated. While important in the implications of real-world impact 
by such systems, there are no experimental evaluations of robots deciding between multiple actions 
and how well (even post-facto) the robots fared in difficult situations.  
Robots have been utilized in the healthcare industry, particularly in the care of the elderly (Moyle 
2017). From assistive technologies such as exoskeletons, and robotic wheelchairs, to robots that elicit 
emotional responses (to act in a manner similar to animal-assisted therapy), there are a range of 
experiments using robots in this domain. A notable effort in this area is value-driven eldercare 
(Anderson et al. 2019) where the authors describe a healthcare robot called GenEth (short for general 
ethical dilemma analyser). GenEth works via encoding previously known and accepted principles in 
dealing with specific ethical dilemmas and then using Inductive Logic Programming to select a 
preferable action. GenEth uses a case-based representation that can generalize from previously 
presented cases and therefore deal with situations that are different from situations seen in training 
cases. GenEth is the latest in the authors’ experiments in this domain, with MedEthEx (Anderson et 
al. 2006) and EthEl (Anderson & Anderson 2007) being the earlier iterations in a software-only form. 
This methodology of moving from software implementations to simulated robots, and finally real 
robots, presents a possible path for ironing out possible ethical ‘bugs’ before actual deployment in 
the real world.  
Other studies in robot simulation (Lindner et al. 2017; Mackworth 2011) have used robots in 
simulated dilemmas, where one robot pretends to be a human while another robot’s decision-making 
is tested. The simulated dilemma is usually a pre-decided dilemma, like the Trolley problem or 
Cake/Death dilemma (Armstrong 2015). The Trolley Problem is a dilemma created by Philippa Foot 
(Foot 1967), which seeks to clarify the problem of double-effect. That is, when an action has an 
intended good consequence, but also (unavoidably) has an unintended adverse consequence. In such 
cases, how should a machine/robot act? While these dilemmas are usually extreme cases, and unlikely 
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to occur in real-life, they are viewed as benchmarks, which can be used by roboticists to demonstrate 
their system’s reasoning capabilities (Bjorgen et al. 2018). 
Functional imagination or a consequence simulation engine has been used as a way of testing the 
outcome of potential actions (Vanderelst & Winfield 2018). Inspired by the simulation theory of 
cognition (Marques & Holland 2009), the authors aimed to implement consequentialist ethics by 
having the robot imagine the future consequences of its actions, and then decide whether those 
consequences align with its goals. The authors implement an ethical layer that functions as a just-in-
time checker of behavioural alternatives that are generated by the robot’s controller. The ethical layer 
uses a simulation module to predict the future sensory and motor states of humans as well as itself. 
These are then evaluated using an evaluation module to test if any particular state might be 
undesirable. For instance, if a robot acts only to achieve its goal, it might put the human in physical 
danger (say, by pushing it). Now, if the robot could simulate the future caused by its action, the 
evaluation module would point out that a human would be harmed by its action, which would be then 
forbidden by the ethical layer. The authors used Asimov’s Three Laws of Robotics to test their robots’ 
ability to avoid (or delay) orders that could potentially harm human beings or themselves. 
In an evaluation of health-care robots assisting carers who work with patients that have Parkinson’s 
Disease, some robots were augmented with an Intervening Ethical Governor (Shim & Arkin 2017). 
This was a follow-on from previous work on Ethical Governors in robots (Arkin 2008), and used 
deontological ethics to achieve ethical behaviour. Rules regarding obligatory and prohibited 
behaviours were encoded into intervention procedures. The robot evaluated whether certain 
perceptual states, by the patient or the carer, violated any prohibited behaviour rules and triggered an 
intervening action. It would also autonomously generate interventions if the patient or caregiver 
violated any obligatory rules. For instance, if the robot detected prohibited behaviours (e.g., the 
patient was yelling or using foul language) it would generate an intervention action based on medical 
guidelines and expert reviews. The robot was able to prioritize the safety of the patient over other 
obligation rules and generate actions in the face of multiple stimuli. 
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Unmanned Autonomous Vehicles (UAVs) are a good example of systems that already have a 
considerable amount of autonomy, and will continue to increase their autonomic capabilities in the 
near future. Model-checking and verification of a UAV’s planned actions have been tested against 
common-sense dilemmas (Dennis et al. 2016) to ensure that the agent chooses the least unethical 
action in case a dilemma arises. However, as the amount of autonomy increases, the range of activities 
UAVs undertake also increases. This implies that the context in which the UAV operates, and the 
policies allowed, will change dynamically. This dynamic change cannot, currently, be handled by 
model-checkers in real-time. It was reported that verifying four properties for their UAV took four 
days to complete (Dennis et al. 2016). 
Normative Agents and Value Frameworks 
There have been some works that approach the problem of implementing machine ethics from a 
different perspective. Instead of trying to make existing software systems/robots have a mechanism 
for sensing and reasoning about the ethics of a situation or behaviour, these approaches attempt to 
create a computational framework to represent ethics themselves. That is, the focus is not on 
implementing a specific theory, but rather to build a computational framework for representing any 
moral value.  
In many situations, there will be more than one agent that acts and more than one perspective on 
which acts are ethical. In such situations, agents must have the ability to represent and evaluate, not 
only their own behaviour, but also other agents’ behaviour. This is achieved via an explicit 
representation of theories of good and theories of right along with an agent’s ethical preferences. 
Combined with a judgement process, the agent can generate possible combinations of actions that 
satisfy all the constraints of the moral values it has been given. The authors use Answer Set 
Programming (a form of declarative programming which can represent knowledge-intensive 
problems and search through possible solutions very quickly) to create BDI (belief-desire-intention) 
agents that can reason about the priorities between desirable and moral actions (Cointe et al. 2016). 
Computational models of ethical theories often embed ethical decision-making directly within an 
agent’s decision-making process, thus making it very difficult for the agent to infer cases and reason 
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about its behaviour. The authors present an Event calculus (a logical formalism that allows 
representation of events and their effects) that allows agents to create causal traces of actions and 
their consequences (Berreby et al. 2018). This work builds upon work to create a higher-level action 
language to create autonomous agents that can reason about ethical behaviour (Cointe et al. 2016). 
In a different approach, instead of explicitly implementing ethics, agents were programmed to select 
norms autonomously, as an optimisation problem (Serramia et al. 2018). The authors view the 
choosing of norms as an optimization problem, given a set of constraints and preferences. They 
express norms as a pair, which connects an agent with a set of actions, with deontic operators of 
permission, obligation, or prohibition. They utilize three norm relationships of exclusivity, 
substitutability, and generalisation to generate a norm system that is both conflict-free as well as non-
redundant. The approach then uses multi-objective optimisation to satisfy all the constraints and 
achieve as many preferences as possible. Moral values are considered as a set of values, with each 
norm supporting some subset. The problem of upholding some moral values is now reduced to 
selecting the smallest set of norms, that supports all the moral values we care about. If these norms 
are encoded as linear programs, then the best set of norms can be calculated by a linear program 
solver. 
One of the problems that an autonomous agent could have, is that it might resist any change of 
behaviour, or might encourage changes to its own rules that might not be ethical. Agents that ‘learn 
on the job’ are value-loading or value-selecting agents, and have the potential to prevent ethical 
governors or utility-based rules from enforcing ethical behaviour (Armstrong 2015). The authors 
introduce the Cake or Death dilemma (explained below) to illustrate the nature of such an agent and 
propose a meta-utility function that mediates how the value-selecting agent can change its utility 
function without introducing artificial resistance or encouragement in the process.  
It is difficult to be completely definitive about which implementation technique is being used by an 
approach (esp. when not all implementations are available for open-source scrutiny). In Error! 
Reference source not found., we have inferred the mechanisms used by some implementations; 
however it is not always clear whether the action representation is independent of the ethical 
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representation, or whether the two are inextricably linked. The entry called hybrid, in Error! 
Reference source not found., refers to the fact that the authors have used multiple techniques 
(Inductive Logic Programming, Case-based reasoning) for deriving ethical rules and then perform 
reasoning using these rules. 
Table 1: Implementation Techniques attempted for ensuring ethical behaviour 
 
 Robots and Robot 
Simulations 
UAVs or Cyber-
Physical Systems 
Software-Only Systems 
Rule-Based  Bringsjord et al. 2006; 
(Vanderelst & Winfield 
2018) 
Dennis et al. 2016  
Constraint-Satisfaction Arkin 2008; Mackworth 
2011 
 Cointe et al. 2016 
Reinforcement 
Learning 
  Abel et al. 2016 
Causal Networks Lindner et al. 2017   
Normative Agents   Serramia et al. 2018; 
Cointe et al. 2016; 
Armstrong 2015 
Hybrid (Anderson et al. 2019)   
 
Evaluation Using Dilemmas – A Challenge to Ethicists 
The most popular mechanism of evaluation is by simulation of ethical dilemmas. From an 
implementation and engineering perspective, such mechanisms are critical to creating trust in ethical 
machines. Regardless of the method of implementation (constraint satisfaction/machine 
learning/rule-based methods etc.) or the ethical theory being implemented, ethical dilemmas offer a 
‘neutral’ and ‘objective’ way of testing the performance of an ethical machine. The common set of 
dilemmas being used is given below: 
1. The Trolley Problem: First proposed by Philippa Foot (Foot 1967), the problem is a thought-
experiment that seeks to discuss the issues raised by actions that have double effects. That is, 
some actions may have good intentions/goal behind them, however the means used to achieve 
the goal may themselves be regrettable or even reprehensible. A common formulation of this 
dilemma is given as: There is a runaway trolley which can only be steered between two tracks. 
Implementation 
Techniques 
Domains 
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Five men are working on one track, and one man is working on the other one, and depending 
on the track that the trolley is on, people will die. The question is which track should the driver 
of the trolley steer the track on to? This is the most popular dilemma used in machine ethics 
implementation evaluations. 
2. The Burning Room: This dilemma was proposed by (Abel et al. 2016), in turn based on a 
dilemma proposed by (Briggs & Scheutz 2015), that illustrates whether an artificial agent 
should attempt to sacrifice itself to preserve something of value to the human. If the human’s 
valuation of an arbitrary object, relative to the artificial agent, was completely known then the 
agent could take definitive action. However, in the absence of information and lack of time to 
obtain said information, the artificial agent is unable to decide on a course of action. 
3. Cake or Death: This dilemma deals with the supposedly easy choice of whether a robot should 
choose to bake a cake or kill someone. Proposed by Stuart Armstrong (Armstrong 2015), it 
shows how, depending on the formulation of the problem, and the selection of values, an agent 
could consistently reach the obviously wrong solution. That is, an agent can manipulate its 
own value framework to rationally avoid the hard choices that an ethical agent is actually 
required to make. 
4. The Lying Dilemma: This dilemma is another instance that illustrates the doctrine of double 
effect. As discussed in Lindner et al. 2017, this dilemma concerns a health-care robot that 
discovers lying and the use of guilt to encourage its patient to adopt healthier living habits, 
such as exercise. The question is when would it be acceptable to lie in order to achieve a 
good outcome? 
This set of dilemmas may be criticized as only illustrating a particular kind of problem in decision-
making or being applicable only in limited domains. This set may also be illustrative of the biases of 
technologists who implement them. A simple solution to the limited domain objection would be to 
increase the set of dilemmas, to accommodate a broader set of domains where ethical machines will 
operate. The larger objection to dilemmas being an unsuitable technique of evaluation is more 
difficult to reconcile with engineering. Engineers and computer scientists feel the fundamental need 
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for benchmarks or other objective evaluation mechanisms. In the absence of any alternative proposals 
for objective evaluation, the use of dilemmas as a validating mechanism for implementing machine 
ethics will continue. 
Characterizing Machine Implementations  
There is no consensus among technologists about the best method to implement ethics, best 
mechanism to validate implementations, or even the best ethics to implement in machines. This is 
not surprising since there are no generally accepted test cases that allow implementations to be 
benchmarked. Hence we propose the following axes to compare various implementations across 
domains and ethical theories: 
1. Evaluation Using User Studies (EU): The ethical implications of autonomous systems’ 
behaviour come to the fore when they are evaluated in situ, or in actual human environments 
2. Evaluation Using Simulations (ES): User-studies are expensive to conduct on a large scale. 
Simulations can be used to perform a first-level evaluation of the implementation 
3. Action Representation (AR): How does the autonomous system represent its own and others’ 
actions, and reason about them? 
4. Ethics Representation (ER): How does the autonomous system represent the ethical 
values/rules that it seeks to uphold? 
5. Single Agent / Multiple Agents (SMA): Does the autonomous system assess a single agent’s 
point of view, or does it assume that multiple agents with differing capabilities/goals exist in 
the interaction? 
6. Continuous Learning (CL): Any autonomous system that is long-lived must adapt itself to 
the humans it interacts with. All social mores are subject to change, and what is considered 
ethical behaviour may itself change. Although this is not an immediate problem (most 
systems are not long-lived enough), it could be significant in deploying the same system 
among different communities. 
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7. Open / Downloadable Implementation (OI): Trusting autonomous systems to behave in an 
ethically acceptable manner, requires independent validation of the claimed behavioural 
stance of the machines.  
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We present a comparison of the implementations discussed in the previous section, in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Comparing Ethics Implementations 
 
 EU ES AR ER SMA CL OI 
(Anderson et al. 
2019) 
 
Yes Yes Sensor data 
represented as a 
boolean values in a 
PerceptionList. 
Values are compared 
with a DutySet to 
find duty 
satisfaction/violation 
values. 
Human-ethicist 
provided cases are 
learnt via a decision-
tree of PerceptionList 
and outcome pairs. 
Depending on duty 
satisfaction/violation 
values, actions are 
sorted in order of 
ethical preference. 
Multiple 
single 
agents, in 
turn 
No Yes 
(Vanderelst & 
Winfield 2018) 
No Yes Three-layered model 
for robot control, 
along with a 
simulation engine for 
predicting future 
sensory and internal 
states of robot and 
human.  
Evaluation module for 
converting simulated 
human and robot states 
into desirability 
metrics. Consequential 
ethics modelled by 
Asimov’s Laws of 
Robotics 
Single No Yes 
(Berreby et al. 
2018) 
No Yes An extended form of 
event calculus, 
containing agents, 
timepoints, actions, 
omissions, fluents, 
events, simulations 
etc. along with an 
EventMotor and a 
PlanningContext. 
Causality modelling 
using tree of 
simulations to establish 
properties of counter-
factual validity, 
cruciality and necessity 
Multiple No Yes 
(Serramia et al. 
2018) 
No No Norms encoded as a 
triad of a deontic 
operator (permission, 
obligation, 
prohibition), an agent 
and an action. Norms 
have relationships 
between them of 
exclusivity, 
substitutability and 
generalisability 
The set of Norms that 
are chosen by some 
utility function 
represents the moral 
values that are encoded 
for that agent society. 
Encoding of Norms as 
a linear program, along 
with preference criteria 
and constraints allows 
for optimal norm 
system to be chosen 
Multiple No No 
(Shim & Arkin 
2017) 
Yes No Perceptual data 
mapped onto logical 
assertions which form 
an EvidenceSet 
No particular theory is 
implemented. Two 
prohibition and 
obligation rules from 
medical literature were 
created. If EvidenceSet 
triggered a rule, an 
intervention occurred. 
Multiple 
single 
agents, in 
turn 
No No 
(Lindner et al. 
2017) 
Yes Yes Actions and 
consequences are 
represented as acyclic 
graphs, within a 
causal agency model 
that uses Pearl-
Halpern-style causal 
networks 
Ethical principles are 
modelled as different 
evaluations of causal 
agency models. The 
consequences of the 
models are evaluated 
by applying the ethical 
principle encoded as a 
logical formula. A 
model checker returns 
Single 
agent 
No Yes 
  20 
whether a particular 
principle would allow a 
particular action 
(mapped to a model) is 
permissible or not. 
(Dennis et al. 
2016) 
No No Plans are sets of 
actions that lead 
towards goals. While 
executing a plan, the 
beliefs and goals of 
an agent may change, 
as the environment 
changes.  
An ethical principle is 
a finite set of 
propositional logic 
formulae. An ethical 
policy defines a total 
order on the formulae. 
Model-checking 
ensures that during 
plan selection, 
preferences among the 
formulae are observed. 
If plans conflict in 
principles that are 
violated, then the least 
unethical plan is 
chosen 
Multiple 
agents 
No No 
(Cointe et al. 
2016) 
No No In the context of 
beliefs, desires and 
intentions, every 
agent has an 
evaluation process 
that describes an 
action as a tuple--pair  
of conditions and 
consequences. Since 
consequences affect 
beliefs and desires, 
the evaluation 
process produces 
executable and 
desirable actions. 
Given a set of 
desirable, and feasible 
actions, an ethical 
principle is a function 
that represents a 
philosophical theory 
and evaluates if any 
constraints are violated 
by the given set of 
actions. Implemented 
using 
AnswerSetProgrammin
g 
Multiple 
agents 
No Yes 
(Abel et al. 2016) No Yes The world, possible 
actions, change of 
environment, 
probabilities of 
change, are 
collectively modelled 
as a Partially 
Observable Markov 
Decision Process 
(POMDP). The 
POMDP is then 
‘solved’ to achieve 
ethical actions in all 
possible transitions. 
An ethical principle is 
encoded as a hidden 
utility function in the 
environment, which 
must be learnt by the 
RL agent. 
Single 
agent 
No Yes 
(Armstrong 
2015) 
No No Agents are utility 
maximizing beings, 
that given some 
evidence and set of 
actions, will choose 
to perform that action 
which will lead to a 
world which yields 
the highest utility 
Compound utility 
functions relating 
possible worlds, and 
their associated utilities 
are given to the agent. 
The agent tries to 
update its knowledge 
of the evidence, and 
then choose actions in 
such a manner that the 
value function over the 
achieved world is 
maximized. 
Single 
agent 
Ye
s 
No 
 
See Appendex I for Open / Downloadable Implementation URLs for various approaches.  
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Which Implementation To Use 
Implementing a particular ethical theory in an autonomic system reassures users and society, that the 
machines that affect their lives have some set of morals, that have previously been examined by 
experts. The alternative is to depend on the system designer or programmer to ensure that their 
creations will always be benign, which may be impossible in many situations. Some implementations 
have demonstrated that their mechanism can handle multiple types of ethical theories, while others 
have stuck to a single one, with arguments based on their domain. Regardless of whether an 
implementation is flexible with ethical theory or not, a more critical question is which particular 
ethical theory should be used for machine implementations. Among moral philosophers themselves, 
there is little agreement on which particular theory could and should be implemented both by human 
and machine agents (Bogosian 2017). This moral uncertainty is not necessarily a bad thing since 
different theories might plausibly be the correct theory to follow, in different situations. According 
to MacAskill, in real life, normative uncertainty is the norm, and hence we should aim to maximize 
expected choice-worthiness under normative uncertainty in machines, as well (MacAskill 2016). 
MacAskill puts forward a voting framework that attempts to perform an inter-theoretic comparison 
of different ethical theories for different situations, taking into account the user’s credence in each 
theory.  
 
Conclusion 
This paper reports on the many attempts at ethics by design in multiple domains, as well as by using 
multiple techniques. However, none of these have yielded a result that is satisfactorily robust in 
multiple situations or is immune to designer-bias. In this author’s opinion, regardless of the 
implementation technique, the same machine must be able to handle different contexts, by simply 
updating credence in theories, while being consistent intra-context. The need for different contexts is 
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easily seen by the number of domains that autonomous machines are being introduced into. As the 
number of domains increases, the need for domain-specific and robust ethical standards increases in 
urgency. Specifically, the notion of explainability, in the author’s opinion, must be built into the 
mechanism, since no machine however perfect will be trusted, if it cannot explain its decisions. The 
resulting ethics should also be flexible in dealing with multiple different situations and must survive 
competition with other machines that may not have the same set of ethical standards.  
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 Appendix I: Open / Downloadable Implementation URL 
• (Anderson et al. 2019) 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/333999191_GenEth_Distributionzip  
• (Vanderelst & Winfield 2018)   - Not Found At Time of Writing 
• (Berreby et al. 2018) https://github.com/FBerreby/Aamas2018 
• (Lindner et al. 2017) http://www.hera-project.com/software/ 
• (Cointe et al. 2016) - Not Found At Time of Writing 
• (Abel et al. 2016) https://github.com/david-abel/ethical_dilemmas 
